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Economic Information and Finance: 






This paper builds on recent work that shows how financial sector outcomes are 
affected by the provision of information by financial and other entities. In 
particular, it shows that an indicator of economic transparency is positively related 
to higher levels of private credit and a lower share of non-performing loans even 
after accounting for factors commonly believed to influence financial sector 
development in cross-country empirical estimation. Timely access to economic data 
allows investors to make better decisions on investments and to better monitor 
banks’ financial health. Greater economic transparency raises accountability and 
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The type and abundance of information in economic markets affects economic 
outcomes. Ackerlof’s seminal (1970) article on the market for lemons, Spence’s (1976) 
work on the impact of signaling in labor markets, Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) work 
on insurance markets and Stiglitz’s (1974) paper on sharecropping present just some of 
the varied informational problems arising in market economies and some of the 
mechanisms which markets have evolved to either reduce information asymmetries or to 
reduce risks associated with operating under less than perfect information. Less than 
perfect information allows some agents to obtain benefits at the expense of others or may 
make all agents worse off if it leads to inefficient outcomes. This paper examines whether 
better information on overall economic conditions supports financial development. 
 Because of the public good nature of information, non-rivalrous consumption and 
non-excludability, there is a presumption that information will be “underproduced” in 
competitive market economies. There are also externalities associated with the 
acquisition of information since it is not easy (or is sometimes not possible) to 
appropriate the returns to collecting information.   The impact of asymmetries in 
information among different agents in financial markets has been thoroughly covered in a 
number of studies. As Stiglitz (1993) notes, the allocation of capital and monitoring its 
use are essentially information problems. Banks need information about potential lenders. 
Banks that have superior information on borrowers may not be willing to share it with 
others. Or banks may be unwilling to invest in obtaining information that they cannot 
“keep” from others if they cannot earn a return sufficient to justify the costs of obtaining   3
information. Within the financial system itself, information about the solvency of 
financial institutions and the management of these institutions is of great value to 
investors/depositors.  But one person’s knowledge about the impending insolvency of a 
financial institution (or poor bank management) does not subtract from another’s 
knowledge. The public good characteristics of this information mean that there will be an 
undersupply of monitoring. Externalities related to lending (once one bank lends to a 
borrower, everyone else knows he is creditworthy) or to the perceptions regarding the 
financial health of banks (once one bank fails investors may conclude that other banks are 
in bad financial condition) also abound.  
There are several papers that expound on the consequences of information 
asymmetries in financial markets. Ackerlof (1970) uses the example of credit markets in 
developing countries where local lenders (who have better, though still imperfect 
information) charge seemingly exhorbitant interest rates. New lenders (outsiders) wishing 
to compete with these lenders generally end up making losses when they enter the market 
because they have less information on borrowers than local lenders who know their town 
and clients. Information asymmetries in this case mean that financial institutions tend 
towards oligopolistic behavior since they will tend to deal with clients they know; 
potential entrants are kept out because of informational barriers. Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) showed how information imperfections can lead to rationing behavior in credit 
markets. In their model, since lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers with 
different risk profiles and because borrowers facing higher risk will also tend to borrow at 
higher interest rates, there will be credit rationing in markets. Lenders’ expected profits 
will not be a monotonically increasing function of the interest rate charged. In   4
Townsend’s model (1979), banks compile information and economize on verifying 
borrower conditions, and they also economize on monitoring costs (see also Diamond, 
1984) which would be much higher if individual lenders had to evaluate potential 
borrowers. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, conclude that there would be no bank runs in an 
economy with perfect information on banks since fully informed depositors would expect 
higher interest rates from risky banks and thus curtail risky behavior by banks. In their 
paper, only “shocks” would lead to bank runs.  
Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that in a world of multiple lenders, each bank may 
be discouraged from monitoring the borrower closely to avoid free-riding by other 
lenders. But the costs of multiple lending relationships escalate if each lender or potential 
lender does not have information on the borrower’s debt status, since the default risk is a 
function of the overall indebtedness of a borrower, not just his borrowing from one 
lender. Each lender is also threatened by possible future debt commitments the borrower 
may take on (Bizer and De Marzo, 1992). Thus, Ongena and Smith, 1998, show that the 
number of bank relationships has a negative impact on the availability of credit. This 
suggests that if lenders pool their information, the total amount of credit extended might 
increase (see also Bennardo and Pagano, 2001).  
A number of papers discuss how wider information sharing among firms may affect 
the financial system. Jappelli and Pagano (1993) discuss how the reduction of adverse 
selection problems through information sharing would tend to reduce defaults, though the 
effect on overall lending is ambiguous since lending to good borrowers may increase but 
may not be sufficient to offset the decline in lending to bad borrowers. In another model, 
Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that greater exchange of information about borrower   5
types means banks restrain their ability to obtain future informational rents and in their 
model, interest rates are lower and lending is higher than in the case with lower 
information. This is because information sharing means lower market power. Lower 
market power translates into an expectation of lower interest rates and raises the incentive 
to perform on the part of borrowers. Thus defaults are lowered and lending rises.  
Several papers discuss how markets have responded to information failures by 
developing institutions to deal with them. Good examples of institutional innovations that 
have evolved in response to informational asymmetries are credit registries and credit 
bureaus which facilitate information sharing among lenders (see Jappelli and Pagano, 
2000 for a survey).  Credit bureaus operate on principles of reciprocity and are typically 
voluntary mechanisms. Public credit registries are databases created by public authorities 
and managed by central banks. These registries generally record bank loans and lines of 
credit. In some countries, there are specialized registers for certain classes of debt (e.g. 
those that record the real collateral assisting housing mortgage loans). Data are obtained 
by lenders who are required to report and who in turn obtain a return flow of data to use 
in their lending decisions.   
Since lenders are required to participate in public credit registries, their coverage 
of bank loans tends to be universal, though they may fail to include data provided by 
credit card companies and other financial companies and they may not record loans 
below a certain size. A credit bureau’s information is limited to members.  They tend to 
provide reliable data -timeliness and honesty is forced by threatening expulsion from the 
group in case of non-compliance.  They also provide information on consumer loans and 
small-business loans.  Credit bureaus allow better pricing and targeting of loans, level the   6
informational playing field (and so raise competition and reduce moral hazard, that is 
they reduce the incentives to default). 
Jappelli and Pagano (2000) find that public credit registers are more likely to arise 
where private arrangements are weak and that information sharing arrangements are more 
likely to arise where creditor rights are poorly protected (to compensate for poor 
protection ex-post).
2 But private arrangements may also serve as entry barriers –Jappelli 
and Pagano assert that in Mexico the banks have a vertically integrated arrangement with 
a monopolistic credit bureau system that prevent new banks (having an informational 
disadvantage) from entering. In an empirical study covering several countries Jappelli 
and Pagano (2002) find that information sharing leads to an increase in lending. This 
relationship holds even after accounting for country size and growth rate, and variables 
capturing respect for property rights and respect for the law. Galindo and Miller, 2001, 
find that improved assessment of credit risk as enabled by more information sharing 
translates into higher lending. Pinheiro and Cabral (2001) report that the postdated check 
market operates without collateral, without personal guarantees, and without legal 
sanctions of any type. It is based on an information sharing mechanism (a black list of 
people who write checks without funds to back them). Trivelli, Alvarado and Galarza 
(2001) find that the development of a public rating register in Peru has encouraged 
lenders to shift away from exclusive reliance on collateral towards information based 
lending.  
The design of institutions such as credit registries discussed above affects the type 
of monitoring that takes place in countries since they affect the amount of information 
                                                 
2 The use of collateral can be justified as a response to information asymmetries, as can various types of 
contingent contracts.   7
produced and disseminated. Governments design and implement regulations that provide 
access to information by concerned agents and in some cases may be the sole repository 
of such information. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) focus on a different type of 
information problem in the financial sector and the regulations that might ameliorate 
information asymmetries. A healthy financial sector requires healthy financial 
intermediaries. Banks that are not properly monitored/ supervised may make poor lending 
decisions that cause bank failures. Bank failures are harmful for depositors as well as 
governments (and sometimes the whole economy). The less information there is on how 
lending and borrowing decisions are made and the health of the intermediaries in the 
financial system, the greater the risk of not being able to monitor banks properly, the 
greater the risk of bank crises and the lower will be financial development since agents 
will have less trust in banks and deposits will be low.
3 
A number of measures have been developed to assess the strength of supervisory 
and regulatory measures in the financial sector. Some of these measures aim to strengthen 
private monitoring of banks. For example, supervisory agencies may require banks to 
obtain and publish certified audits, or to produce comprehensive information on a bank’s 
full range of activities and risk management systems.  When banks are required to 
disclose information on their financial health or management systems, bank managers 
will have incentives to ensure that the bank is healthy and well managed in order to 
prevent bank runs.  In other words disclosing information on a bank’s health affects the 
bank’s lending decisions, and the conditions of the portfolio.  
                                                 
3 For references on the incentives of banks to make lending decisions that endanger banking health (see 
Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006).   8
Information disclosure allows private sector monitoring of banks and is an 
important complement to other supervisory/regulatory activities. Moreover, transparency 
in banks provides checks and balances to both bank managers and their public sector 
regulators. When the condition of a bank’s portfolio is publicly disclosed, supervisors 
have a lower ability and incentive to collude with bankers. Private agents are also more 
able to monitor banking health. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) develop indicators to 
assess how much information disclosure is supported by a country’s regulatory and 
supervisory system and relate these and other indicators to financial development. In a 
related paper, doing cross country analysis, La Porta et al (2005) find that securities 
market regulations that induce information disclosure promote stock market development 
while securities regulations that rely on official oversight of markets only boost equity 
market capitalization in countries with efficient government bureaucracies. 
Finally, this paper is related to a recent paper by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(BDL, 2005) who, using firm level data, investigate the relationship between supervisory 
and regulatory policies and bank corruption as an obstacle to raising external financing 
for firms. One of the regulatory tools on which they focus is mandating information 
disclosure by banks. Specifically, they analyze the impact of information disclosure on 
corruption in bank lending. This paper contends that economic transparency, by 
facilitating evaluation and monitoring of lending decisions (in terms of whether loans are 
made to projects based on expectations of profitability or some other criteria) should also 
reduce corruption in bank lending. 
4 
                                                 
4 For example, economic information that shows that a particular industry is facing losses would make a 
corrupt official more wary of lending to friends in that sector.   9
This paper adds to the literature on information asymmetries and finance by 
focusing on the impact of better information about overall macroeconomic conditions on 
financial development. Better information on the economy helps borrowers and lenders 
make better decisions and so may be expected to raise lending. Better information allows 
agents to allocate resources more efficiently within the financial system, it may also raise 
investment by lowering risk or by enabling better risk management. Conversely, when 
there is little up to date knowledge of economic conditions, banks may be more reluctant 
to lend and investors to invest. This would reduce the supply of and demand for credit.  
Better knowledge of economic variables may also help lenders distinguish between 
different types of projects/borrowers- for example some borrowers may be more affected 
by exchange rate changes than others. Some may be more affected by the government’s 
fiscal decisions than others. Knowing how different macroeconomic variables are 
evolving in a timely manner assists lenders in differentiating between borrowers; they 
will lend more to those who are expected to do better given the information received on 
macroeconomic outcomes.  They will accordingly lend less to others and the overall 
effect may be higher or lower lending. Similarly on the demand side, borrowers who see 
better outcomes for their projects will enter the market where others will leave. The net 
result on private credit through this channel is ambiguous though the portfolio should 
improve (non-performing loans fall).  
Knowledge of economic conditions would help in managing lending portfolios and 
thereby potentially improve the performance of the portfolio (and reduce non-performing 
loans). Knowledge of economic conditions affecting banking profitability would help 
investors and regulators in banks to differentiate between banks that are unhealthy due to   10
internal mismanagement and those whose condition is related to economic outcomes. 
Thus up-to-date information on economic conditions could have a positive effect on 
financial sector development. This paper contends that better information on economic 
variables lowers risk and helps lenders and borrowers make better judgements about 
borrowing and lending decisions. Overall credit may rise or fall, but bank portfolios 
should improve.  
This paper uses an indicator that reflects the timeliness of economic data reported 
by governments- called the transparency indicator (Islam, 2006) as an indicator of 
knowledge available to the general public on key economic variables. It links the 
timeliness of data as measured by this indicator to financial sector development.  In the 
following section, the paper lays out in more detail why information on economic 
outcomes may lead to overall financial sector development, though it does not go so far 
as to build a theoretical model showing these links. This is followed by a description of 
the data and empirical strategy. The next section describes the results. 
So far the impact of transparency on private credit and non-performing loans has 
been analyzed without reference to an additional potential source of improved 
performance.  I have assumed that lenders only seek to improve the performance of their 
portfolios. But in the real world, lending decisions are not always based on a desire to 
enhance efficiency and profits of the bank. Bank officials or supervisors may be corrupt 
and may hinder an efficient or competitive allocation of credit. The impact of 
transparency on the behavior of the portfolio may come about because of institutional 
factors or improved governance: that is it may reduce corruption. When information is 
available that allows better monitoring and evaluation of the decisions that supervisors   11
and lenders make, their behavior can be expected to change.  One way to see whether 
governance improves with greater transparency is to look at how transparency affects 
access by firms to finance through its impact on corruption. BDL (2005) conduct an 
empirical investigation into the impact of supervision and private monitoring on 
corruption in lending.  They use the index of supervisory practice and an index of private 
monitoring used in this paper.  In this paper, I extend their analysis and ask whether 
economic transparency affects corruption in bank lending after having accounted for 
supervisory and regulatory practices in the financial sector. Though it is not possible to 
simultaneously investigate all the channels through which economic transparency may 
affect financial sector outcomes, I investigate whether reducing corruption in bank 
lending may be one of the ways in which bank portfolios may improve. 
Theoretical Justification 
In most of the finance literature, information asymmetries are of two types: (a) lack of 
information on borrower type and limited ability to monitor borrower actions lead to 
adverse selection and moral hazard; and (b) insufficient checks and balances (incentives 
and penalties) on bank owners/directors and supervisors, and the presence of moral 
hazard, lead to poor bank portfolios and bank failures. Usually, the literature has focused 
on how improving information asymmetries between (a) regulators and depositors on the 
one hand and bank management /owners on the other, or (b) lenders and borrowers can 
improve bank portfolios. The primary information asymmetry that this paper focuses on 
is that between the state and private agents. But this information asymmetry has 
consequences for how lenders and borrowers behave. The government knows the 
economic situation but either for political reasons (for example, the desire to hide bad   12
outcomes) or simply because producing and disseminating information has costs greater 
than expected (or internalized) benefits, they do not widely disseminate economic 
information in a timely manner. The information published by government may not 
reflect the current situation. 
5 Yet the profitability of investment (and therefore the 
probability of default on bank lending) depends on key macro-economic variables such as 
the exchange rate, wage rates, interest rates, inflation, the fiscal deficit (or expenditures 
and taxes) and GDP growth. None of these outcomes are known with certainty and both 
borrowers and lenders face greater risk in their activities when they have poorer 
knowledge of economic variables. 
Suppose the expected financial return to the borrower (and therefore the lender), 
ER, depends on a risk factor r, which depends on overall economic conditions and other 
conditions particular to the project in question, p: ER=ER(r,p). If we suppose that r is 
affected differently for different projects (for example, exchange rate depreciation would 
not affect both exporters and non-exporters equally), then we would have a distribution of 
ERs which depend on the realization of several macro variables. If borrowers and lenders 
know how r changes with economic variables, then knowing about economic outcomes 
will help both lenders and borrowers better assess the return on their projects. In 
particular, if the distribution of r changes with new knowledge then lenders will make 
better portfolio choices since they will estimate different expected returns for each 
project. Overall lending may rise or fall depending on the realizations of economic 
outcomes and how these outcomes affect the distribution of projects and bank profits.  
                                                 
5 In such a situation it is still possible to imagine that some private agents (e.g. those connected closely with 
government agents) have preferential access to information.    13
Suppose there are two projects with the same expected return but different risk 
features: B and D, B having higher risk at the current knowledge of economic outcomes. 
Suppose new knowledge reveals that the risk of an exchange rate depreciation has 
increased and suppose that D’s return depends on exchange rate changes (depreciation 
reduces earnings) while B’s does not. With this new knowledge, the relative expected 
return on D will fall and lenders will choose to finance more of type B than D, ceteris 
paribus
6. The expected return on B will rise and profits of the bank will rise (they will 
have fewer defaults) since they will have made better choices than if they had assumed an 
unchanged situation between D and B. If higher profits affect the supply of lending – then 
we can assume that greater economic transparency will increase the amount of credit 
available in the economy at each interest rate, ceteris paribus. It should also reduce the 
ratio of non-performing loans. 
Suppose borrowers have a better knowledge of economic outcomes; they too can 
reassess the type of project in which they will invest. Ceteris paribus, borrowers facing 
reduced expected earnings will not apply for the loan (demand will fall) while those with 
higher expected earnings (D) will demand more loans. Again overall demand may rise or 
fall. That is, at any given interest rate charged the demand curve may shift inwards or 
outwards.  If borrowers and lenders had already purchased contingent contracts to hedge 
exchange rate risk, better knowledge of exchange rates may have less of an effect than in 
the case where contingent contracts are not available.  
What role does corruption play? Suppose with corruption in bank lending and 
given the overall level of credit extended in the economy, the portfolio can be divided 
                                                 
6 Assuming that there are more of this type of borrower.   14
into those loans in which corruption plays a part LC, and those in which there is no 
corruption, L1.  
Suppose officials accept bribes for a certain fraction of loans made. Then the return 
to the officials (as distinct from the bank owners) would be bribes and to the bank, the 
expected returns from LC loans, ELC.  If it is assumed that bribes are made because the 
loan would yield lower expected returns to the bank than other investments, then the 
overall returns to the bank from its portfolio of investments would be lower; the return to 
the now corrupt lending officials would be higher where ELC+bribes would have to be 
the minimum overall return to the borrower. The share of non-performing loans may be 
higher in this scenario. But greater transparency means that it will be easier to detect and 
predict the actual performance of loans. This would also help monitor cases where loans 
are not made on the basis of expected returns but bribes: ability to monitor (and penalize 
corrupt officials), should reduce the incidence of bribes and of LC.
7 In other words, firms 
in general would see corruption as less of a constraint on access to finance when bank 
officials’ decisions can be evaluated better and officials can be held accountable. 
However, this conclusion only holds if there are penalties (reputational or otherwise) 
associated with greater corruption that is revealed by better monitoring.  
 
Empirical Estimation and Data Used 
The empirical estimation conducted in the first part of this paper can be represented 
by the following equation: 
  X T PC δ β α + + =  
                                                 
7 Note that aspects of the private monitoring index developed by BCL can be expected to give information 
on similar aspects of the portfolio and on banking officials’ behaviour. Thus information provided by T 
would complement that provided by the BCL indicators.   15
PC is the measure of financial development, or private credit over GDP. I also use 
the share of non-performing loans in lending values as another measure of financial 
sector development. T is the transparency indicator of interest, and X represents other 
variables affecting financial development. In determining both the choice of the financial 
development indicator and the variables to be put in X, I follow Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(BCL, 2004, 2006). The transparency indicator is taken from Islam (2006), and represents 
the availability of timely economic information in countries.
8 Legal origin has been 
shown to be an important factor determining financial development (see Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2003) and is therefore used as an explanatory variable. Legal origin is 
divided into the following categories following La Porta et al (1999) - French, English, 
Scandinavian, Socialist and German.  
I also include an index constructed by BCL (pmindex and pmindex pc) which 
reflects the amount of information available on banks in order to facilitate private 
monitoring (see Appendix 2). For example, if international audits are required then banks 
need to supply information to auditors.  In addition, I have constructed a slightly adjusted 
private monitoring index (apmindex) in order to focus solely on the availability of 
information rather than the incentive to monitor. I have done this so that the private 
monitoring index is more closely analogous to the economic transparency index, T.
9 I 
have adjusted the index slightly by taking out the question on deposit insurance but 
leaving all the other subindices that refer to actual disclosure of information.
10 
                                                 
8 This index measures how timely or up-to-date is the economic information published by government on 
11 economic variables: inflation, unemployment, output, exchange rates, exports, imports, foreign direct 
investment, government revenue, government expenditure, money supply and the 6 month deposit interest 
rate.  
9 The conclusions regarding T do not change depending whether pmindex or apmindex is used. 
10 BCL give an higher rating to countries with no deposit insurance. They contend that deposit insurance 
reduces the incentives for private monitoring. My goal is to assess the impact of having information   16
In the robustness checks, I also include a measure of the supervisory and 
regulatory strength in the country as a control variable. In order to check whether the 
coefficient on T is picking up the value of information over and above that directly 
related to information sharing among financial intermediaries, I  include in the robustness 
check another variable called creditreg. This index is from Jentsch 2003 and measures a 
number of things: (a) existence credit related information (e.g. bankruptcy data bases), 
(b) access to information mandated by laws or regulation, (c) centralization of 
information for ease of access, (d) content of databases, (e) property rights to 
information. I use a composite of these indices (the summation over the individual 
values). The main purpose of this indicator is to assess both the availability of 
information considered critical for lenders plus the legal and regulatory framework 
governing information production and access. 
Part 1. Private Credit, Non Performing Loans and Transparency 
Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Estimation 
Table A2 in the annex it shows the correlation among the variables used in the first part 
of the paper. A list of variables is shown in Annex 2. As might be expected, T is 
positively related to the measure of private credit (privo) and negatively related to the 
ratio of non-performing loans (npl0204). T is also positively and significantly associated 
with apmindex- the adjusted private monitoring index from BCL(2006).
11 T is positively 
correlated with the credit registry variable (creditregindex). It is also positively correlated 
with private credit and negatively so with the non-performing loans variable.   
                                                                                                                                                 
available rather than to assess the joint effect of disclosure and related incentives for monitoring. By 
adjusting the BCL index, I am constructing an index that is closer to the economic transparency indicator 
that is the main focus of the paper.  
11 The adjusted index deals only with access to information while the unadjusted index (pmindex), which 
also includes a measure of the incentive to monitor, has a lower correlation with T.   17
 
Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
estimations. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
privo  173 45.47 42.13  1.33  232.33 
npl0204  94 9.35 7.58 0.00  30.67 
sdprivo  168 4.51 7.06 0.00  45.92 
sdnpl0204  94 2.37 2.65 0.00  15.04 
T_245  178 4.67 1.14 1.12 6.00 
legor_uk  203 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
legor_fr  203 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
legor_ge  203 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
legor_so  203 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
pmindex  102 7.69 1.36 5.00  11.00 
apmindex  144 7.35 2.24 1.00  12.00 
creditregindex  89 31.03 10.92 10.00 59.00 
ospower  143  10.55 2.96 4.00  14.00 
supower_pc  82 -0.03  0.99 -3.05  1.14 
pmindex_pc  82 0.07 0.95  -2.95 1.46 
gdppn02  163 8.50 1.16 6.31  10.98 
corup0204  140 2.49 1.13 0.00 6.00 
law0204  140 3.71 1.40 0.78 6.00 
Source: see Appendix 2 for variable coding and source 
 
The first set of regressions using OLS are shown in their simplest form in Table 2 
below using the main variables of interest, private credit and non-performing loans. 
Greater economic transparency is associated with either a larger or better performing (as 
implied by the non-performing loan ratio) financial sector. 
 






constant R-squared Number  of 
observations 
npl0204 -3.42***  27.39***  0.14  93 
 (-4.53)  (6.8)     
Privo 19.44  **  -47.3  0.23  170 
  (6.84) (-3.91)     
 (1): numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(2): Coefficients with * indicates significance at the .10 level, ** at the  .05 level and *** for the .01 level. 
It is the same for the other regression tables.    18
Table 3 shows a fuller specification where legal origins are included as 
explanatory variables as are other indices reflecting greater transparency in the financial 
sector, namely, the adjusted private monitoring index (apmindex) and the credit registry 
index (creditregind). In all cases, economic transparency is strongly correlated with better 
financial performance, though interestingly, neither apmindex nor creditregind are.
12 
Calculations (based on the regressions in the first columns)
13 indicate that a one standard 
deviation increase in T raises the private credit to GDP variable by .47 standard 
deviations and reduces the share of non-performing loans by .32 standard deviations.  
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apmindex   2.35 
(1.47) 




creditregindex    -.38 
(-.80) 














#  obs  169  133 83 93 82 65 
 R
2 .41 .49 .46 .21 .21 .21 
Note: 1) Legor_uk are those countries with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system 
origin; legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. (see the appendix 
2  for source and variable description) 
(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at the .10 level, ** at the  .05 level and *** for the .01 level.  
                                                 
12 The private monitoring index is significant when T is excluded from the regressions. 
13 As a check, the calculations were redone in regressions including the private monitoring index but there 
was no substantial difference.   19
 
Using Instrumental Variables 
While the OLS regressions above indicate a strong empirical relationship between 
transparency and financial sector variables, they do not indicate anything about the 
direction of effect. The correlations may come about because of omitted variable bias or 
endogeneity. To control for potential simultaneity bias, I use IV to identify the exogenous 
component of transparency. In order to choose an appropriate instrument for 
transparency, I consider the literature on institutions. Beck et al (2003) and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) argue that countries in tropical climates have tended to produce 
exploitative political regimes that protect a small elite. Such regimes would favor a whole 
array of policies and institutions that limit competition and give advantages to a few. 
These are institutions that have been shown to be less favorable to measures of 
development. One of the key ways in which competition may be limited is to design 
policies and institutions that limit information exchanges. Since informational advantages 
create the potential for rent (or non-pecuniary benefits), we would expect less 
transparency in exploitative regimes and poor institutional environments. Endowments 
affect what types of regimes are established. Following the arguments developed by these 
authors, I use latitude as an instrument for transparency. Latitude is negatively correlated 
with transparency. 
Two other possible instruments for transparency are ethnic diversity and religious 
composition.   The same authors and Barth et al. (2006) have also used these indicators to 
explain financial sector supervision and regulation, including the presence of disclosure 
regulations (or transparency) in the financial sector. These authors have argued that 
countries in which the share of the Muslim and Catholic populations are high tend to be   20
more centralized and hierarchical. Extending this argument, more centralized 
institutional/state structures would require and favor a less open information 
environment. In centralized decisionmaking, fewer players need information. Similarly, 
in more hierarchical decisionmaking fewer players need information (and there is little 
opportunity for the majority to benefit from this information). Such structures would 
probably be associated with less transparency. The Catholic and Muslim shares of the 
population are negatively correlated with transparency. 
Several papers have discussed the impact of ethnic diversity on institutional 
development, growth, social conflict and so on (see Easterly 2001, Alesina and Ferrara, 
2005). Lack of trust between different ethnic groups makes it difficult to develop 
networks which require the sharing of information among other things. Countries with 
high ethnic diversity tend to have poorer institutions and therefore might be expected to 
have low transparency – or less sharing of information. Estimations indicate that ethnic 
diversity and transparency are (significantly) negatively correlated.  
Ethnic diversity, latitude, the share of the population that is catholic or muslim all 
turn out to be good instruments. Using ethnic diversity and latitude as instruments below, 
I find that greater transparency means better financial development. In fact, a one 
standard deviation increase in T is associated with a .57 standard deviation increase in the 
private sector to GDP ratio and a .41 decline in the non-performing loan ratio. Note that 
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Private Credit  NPL/total loan 




























































# obs  146  114  80  69 
R
2 .64 .70 .67 .46 
 
Note: 1) Legor_uk are those countries with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system 
origin; legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. (see the appendix 
2  for source and variable description) 
(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at the .10 level, ** at the  .05 level and *** for the .01 level.  
(4): The instruments passed the over-identification test, with Hansen J statistic quite small (p-value for the  
χ
2 larger than .95). We also looked at the first step regression in the 2SLS, to make sure the instruments are 
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Private Credit  NPL/total loan 

































































#  obs 87  113 61 77 
R
2 .77 .76 .56 .47 
 
Note: 1) Legor_uk are those countries with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system 
origin; legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. (see the appendix 
2  for source and variable description) 
(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at the .10 level, ** at the  .05 level and *** for the .01 level.  
(4): The instruments passed the over-identification test, with Hansen J statistic quite small (p-value for the  
χ
2 larger than .95). I also looked at the first step regression in the 2SLS, to make sure the instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable  with the p-value for the F-test smaller than .05.   
 
  It is possible that in a country with overall better governance, economic 
transparency would not have an additional impact on financial development. I run the 
base regressions again controlling for measures of governance such as law and order and 
corruption.  When supervisory indices and measures of governance are used as controls 
in the OLS specifications the coefficient on transparency remains strongly significant.  
Table 6 shows different IV specifications that include measures of governance.  In all the 
specifications for the npl variable, T continues to be significant, indicating that better   23
economic information helps sort good and poor projects. As controls, I also use the 
principal components of the supervisory and regulatory indices (as in BCL) – simple 
indices which sum over the different components were also tried and gave similar results. 
However, in these specifications, the coefficient on T loses significance when pmindex 
pc, the complete BCL monitoring index, is included and instead the BCL index is 
significant. Interestingly, when apmindex is used instead, it is not significant.  In 
addition, overall corruption in the economy is not significant.  When law and order is 
used as the governance measure as a control, it is significant, but has the wrong sign for 
the npl variable and but now pmindex pc is no longer significant.  T continues to be 
significant in most specifications. Table 7 shows the IV specification using law and order 
– transparency raises private credit and lowers non-performing loans. Note that 
corruption overall has no impact on either dependent variable while law and order is 
usually significant for higher levels of private credit. These results suggest that economic 
transparency is quite robustly related to better financial sector performance. The results in 
the various specifications also suggest that greater economic transparency may be a 
substitute for greater transparency within the financial system in the sense that both types 
of transparency allow market participants to judge the performance of banking portfolios 
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Private Credit  NPL/total loan 
  IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 




















































































































































#  obs 83 61 93  68  64 54 74 61 
 R
2 .80 .79 .79  .79  .45 .60 .54 .64 
 
Note: 1) Legor_uk are those countries with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system 
origin; legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. Latitude is the 
absolute average latitude of the country (“lat_abg”), ethnic diversity is the “avelf” index. Ospower is the 
official supervisory power index, apmindex is the adjusted private monitoring index, pmindex_pc is the 
principal component for the private monitoring index, supower_pc is the principal component of the 
supervisory power index. Corup0204 is the ICRG corruption index, average over 2002~04 (see Aappendix 
2 for the source and variable description) (see the appendix 2  for source and variable description) 
(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at the .10 level, ** at the  .05 level and *** for the .01 level.  
(4): For IV1, the instruments for T are avelf, lat_avg, cathshare, and muslshare. For IV2, the instruments 
are lat_avg, indep,  cathshar, and muslshare (see Appendix2  for variable descriptions and sources).  
(5): The instruments (except the one used in the last column for IV2) passed the over-identification test, 
with Hansen J statistic quite small (p-value for the χ
2 larger than .10). We also looked at the first step 
regression in the 2SLS, to make sure the instruments are correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
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Private Credit  NPL/total loan 
  IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 




















































































































































#  obs 83 61 93  54  64 68 74 61 
 R
2 .82 .80 .82  .62  .53 .80 .54 .64 
 
Note: 1) Legor_uk is those with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system origin; 
legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. Latitude is the Absolute 
average latitude of country, ethnic diversity is the avelf index. Ospower is official supervisory power 
(summation of the 14 dummries), apmindex is adjusted private monitoring index, pmindex_pc is the 
principal component for the private monitoring index, supower_pc is the principal component of the 
supervisory power index. Law0204 is the ICRG index on law and order, average over 2002~04 (see the 
appendix table for source and variable description) 
(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistic. 
(3): Coefficients with * means it is significant at .10 level, ** at .05 level and *** for.01 level. It is the same 
for the other regression tables.  
(4):For IV1, the instruments for T are avelf, lat_avg, cathshare, and muslshare. For IV2, the instruments 
are lat_avg, indep,  cathshar, and muslshare (see Appendix 2  for variable description and source).  
(5):The instruments passed the over-identification test, with the Hansen J statistic quite small (p-value for 
the χ
2 larger than .10). We also looked at the first step regression in the 2SLS, to make sure the instruments 
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Part 2. Corruption in Bank Lending and Transparency 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Estimation  
 
In this section of the paper, I use and extend the estimation procedure in BDL 
(2005) to investigate whether economic transparency reduces corruption in bank lending. 
BDL use both firm specific and country specific data to assess how corruption may 
hinder access to finance. Much of the firm specific data, including the data on corruption 
in bank lending comes from a WBES firm level survey that covers 81 countries.  
The dependent variable, corruption in bank lending, comes from a questionnaire 
which attempts to identify if corruption is an obstacle to firms’ access to finance. Bank 
corruption, is the response to the question: “How problematic is corruption of bank 
officials for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no 
obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). 12% in the 
sample report 4, 12 % report 3, 19% report 2 and 57% report 1. The dependent variable 
for the next three IV probit models is a binary response model based on Bank Corruption 
– with 1(no obstacle) recoded as 0, and all the other values recoded as 1 (obstacle to 
various degrees). This grouping puts 57% in the first category and 43% in the second. 
WBES data are useful in that they provide direct information on obstacles to financing, 
broad country and firm level coverage, and allow one to correct for both firm specific and 
country specific factors.
14 
The WBES survey includes data on firm type. The variable government takes on 
the value 1 if the government owns any percentage of the firm. Foreign takes on the 
value 1 if foreign entities take on any fraction of the firm. The sample includes 12% 
                                                 
14 BDL (2005) point out that several papers have shown that these subjective indicators are correlated with 
objective measures of performance.    27
government owned firms and 19% foreign owned firms. The regressions include 
dummies for whether the firm is an exporter, whether it produces manufactured goods, 
or is a service sector firm. The regressions also include the log of the number of 
competitors that each firm faces and the log of sales in USD as an indicator of size. 
The regressions control for the strength of supervision and regulation and also 
include the private monitoring variable constructed by BCL and used by both BCL and 
BDL. The country level controls used are, as in BDL, growth of GDP (since firms in 
faster growing economies may face fewer obstacles), the inflation rate to proxy for 
market stability (firms in more stable markets face fewer obstacles, Boyd et al 2001), 
overall credit (overall financial development eases credit constraints). Overall corruption 
is a control as well. 
The regression estimated is: 
. sup 13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
T PMpc erpc PC Inf Growth
Comp Sales Serv M X F G BC
β β β β β β
β β β β β β β α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
 
 
Even after the inclusion of all these variables, I expect to find that greater 
transparency reduces corruption in lending because more information enables both 
supervisors and private agents to monitor behavior of bank officials and portfolios. Better 
monitoring enhances accountability of officials since there is a greater chance that 
corruption or other wrongdoing would be exposed and punished by clients or others.  
Table A1b in the appendix shows the correlation among the main variables and Table 8 
shows the summary statistics for the variables. Table 9 shows the ordered probit and 
binary IV probit regressions. Controls for supervisory power, and private monitoring are 
included.    28
 
 
Table 8. Summary Statistics for the Variables 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
bank_corup  8075 1.77 1.05  1  4
t_245_new  9932 5.26 0.88 1.67  6
avelf  7968 0.35 0.29  0 0.89
lat  9059 27.88 17.70  0.23 59.28
gvt_yn  9645 0.12 0.33  0  1
frk_yn  9673 0.19 0.39  0  1
exp_yn  9463 0.36 0.48  0  1
manuf  5463 0.24 0.43  0  1
service  5463 0.35 0.48  0  1
lsale  9034 9.87 8.00  -2.12  25.33
lncomp  9538 0.83 0.34  0 2.20
inflat_9599  9607 27.27 43.60  0.76  252.66
growth_9599  10032 3.56 4.04  -5.46  33.26
lpriv9599  9807 3.06 1.61  -7.74 5.31
suppower_pc 6658 -0.01  0.96 -3.05  1.14
pmindex_pc  6658 -0.10  0.87 -1.83  1.46
gdppn9599  9932 8.41 0.93 6.21  10.37
apmindex  8825 7.85 2.10  1  12
 
Source: see appendix. 
 
 
The results in Table 9 below indicate that greater economic transparency reduces 
corruption in bank lending and should increase access to bank finance. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of several firm and country specific variables, though surprisingly, 
the coefficients on the supervisory indicators are not significant. In every specification, 
more transparency clearly reduces bank corruption- the results are robust across 
specifications.  IV specification strengthens the results. Interestingly, exporting firms’ 
access to credit is not hindered by bank corruption (they presumably have more potential 
sources of credit-such as trading partners). Restrictive supervisory practices are 
associated with more corruption in all specifications and the monitoring index, pmindex 
pc, with less. The private monitoring index is not significant in the IV specifications.    29
 
Table 9.
15 Regressions for Bank Corruption (with T instrumented by latitude and 
ethnic diversity) 
 








IV Provit  IV Probit  IV Provit  IV Provit 


































































































































































































apmindex     .04*** 
(2.67) 
    .34*** 
(13.04) 








#  obs 2850 2850 2850 3380 2850 2850 2850 3380 
Pseudo R
2 .04 .04 .05 .04         
 
Note: 1) The first four ordered probit models are run with standard MLE with heteorskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable for ordered probit is Bank corruption, which is the response to the 
question “How problematic is corruption of bank officials for the operation and growth of your 
business?”. Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major 
obstacle).The dependent variable for the next four IV probit models is binary response  based on Bank 
Corruption – with 1(no obstacle) recoded as 0, and all the other values recoded as 1(obstacle to various 
degree). See Appendix 2 for variable description and sources. 
(2): Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level and *** for.01 level.  
(4): The Wald  endogeniety tests for IV probit models all show that the IV regression is valid (in the sense 
that it is significantly different from the non-IV models). 
                                                 
15 Using muslim and catholic share of the population and other combinations gives similar results.   30
Conclusion 
This paper has estimated the impact of greater economic transparency on the 
financial sector, specifically on the availability of credit, the share of non-performing 
loans in the portfolio, and on corruption in bank lending. The results indicate that even 
after accounting for the usual measures of financial disclosure and information flow used 
in the literature, economic transparency has a significant positive and robust impact on 
private credit, and a negative and statistically significant impact on non-performing loans 
and corruption in bank lending. These results inform policy and validate the importance 
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Appendix 1 
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0.0
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15 -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
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8 -0.3  0.61 
0.5
5 1 
Note: Those highlighted correlations are those not significant at the 0.1 level (p-value bigger than .1). 
Those with * are with significance at 0.1 level. Those without *  and not highlighted are significant at the  




Variable name  Description  Source 
npl0204  Non performing loans as share of total 
loans, average values over 2002-2004 
Same as above 
privo  Domestic credit to the private sector as 
percent of GDP, average values over 
2002-2004 
Same as above 
T_245  Average of Transparency Index for 
2002, 2004, and 2005 
Author’s calculation 
pmindex  Private Monitoring Index based on 
2003 Banking Regulation Survey  
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine. (2003) 
apmindex  Adjusted Private Monitoring Index, 
based on the 2003 Banking Regulation 
Survey (BCL 2006). This variable 
differs from pmindex in that it is 
Same as above, with author’s adjustment   33
composed as a sum of the following 
components of the survey, with a Yes 
answer taking value of 1, 0 otherwise: 
does accrued, though unpaid, 
interest/principal enter the income 
statement while the loan is still 
performing; or non-performing; are 
financial institutions required to 
produce consolidated accounts 
covering all bank and any non-bank 
financial subsidiaries; are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to supervisors, 
or to the public; are bank directors 
legally liable if information disclosed is 
erroneous or misleading; what are the 
penalties, if applicable (none==0, 
fine==.5, jail ==1); have they been 
enforced; do regulations require credit 
ratings for commercial banks; how 
many of the top ten banks are rated by 
international credit rating agencies; or 
by domestic credit rating agencies; 
which bank activities are rated: bonds 
issuance; commercial paper issuance.  
Legor_uk  English legal origin  La Porta et la, (1999) 
Legor_fr  French legal origin  La Porta et la, (1999) 
Legor_ge  German legal origin  La Porta et la, (1999) 
Legor_sc  Scandinavian legal origin  La Porta et la, (1999) 
Legor_so  Socialist legal origin  La Porta et la, (1999) 
pressfreedomindex  Press freedom index 2005   Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
creditregindex  Credit Information Regulation Index. 
This is the Sum index of regulation of 
business reported in Jentzsch (2006)  
Jentzsch (2006) (see Table 3 in Appendix) 
statownpress  State share of press ownership, based 
on ownership structure of country’s five 
largest newspapers by circulation 
Djankov et al. (2003) 
corrupticrg  Control of corruption measure   ICRG Country Risk Guide 2006, Table 3b. 
lat_avg  Absolute average latitude of country  CIA World Factbook 2005 
avelf ethno-linguistic  fractionalization. It is 
the average of five different indices 
compiled by Easterly and Levine. It is 
the probability of two random people in 
a country not speaking a same 
language 
William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s 
Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, 
November 1997, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
CXII (4), 1203-1250. 
Indep  years since independence. If the value 
is 297 or higher, it will be fixed at the 
cap value of  297. After that, take 
natural log of the years since 
independence 
CIA World Factbook, 1997. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
cathshare  Share of Catholic population  Department of State Religious Freedom Report 
2005 
muslshare  Share of Muslim population  Same as above 
Loggdppc80  Natural log of the gdp per catipa in 
1980 
WDI and author’s calculation 
overfcr Overall  Financial Conglomerates 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine. (2006) 
entrybr  Entry into Banking Requirements 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
ocstring  Overall Capital Stringency 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
crindex  Capital Requirements Index 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
pcpower  Prompt Corrective Power 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
rpower  Restructuring Power Restrictiveness 
2003 
Same as above 
dipower  Declaring Insolvency Power 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
divindex Diversification  Index  Restrictiveness  Same as above   34
2003 
indsa  Independence of  Supervisory 
Authority Index Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
mulsup  Multiple Supervisors Restrictiveness 
2003 
Same as above 
caudit  Certified Audit Required 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
bacct  Bank Accounting Restrictiveness 2003  Same as above 
govbank Government-Owned  Banks 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
seaudit  Strength of External Audit 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
acctpra  Accounting Practices Restrictiveness 
2003 
Same as above 
fstrans  Financial Statement Transparency 
Restrictiveness 2003 
Same as above 
Gvt_yn  Dummy variables that take the value 1 
if the firm has government ownership 
and zero if not. 
WBES survey, 2000, available at  
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-
wbes 
Frk_yn  Dummy variables that take the value 1 
if the firm has foreign ownership and 
zero if not. 
Same as above 
Exp_yn  dummy variable that indicates if the 
firm is an exporting firm.  
Same as above 
manuf  Dummy for manufacturing  industry   Same as above 
service  Dummy for service  industry  Same as above 
lsale  Log of sales in US $  Same as above 
lncomp  Log of number of competitors  Same as above 
Inflat_9599  Inflation rate, average over 1995~1999  GDP & WDI database, Sep 2006 
Gdppn02  GDP per capita in 2002   GDP & WDI database, Sep 2006 
Growth_9599  GDP growth rate, average over 
1995~1999 
Same as above 
Lpriv9599  claims on the private sector by deposit 
money banks as share of GDP, 
average over 1995~1999 
Same as above 
Suppower_pc  principal components indicator of the 
power of supervisory agency to 
discipline and monitor banks 
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine. (2001) 
Pmindex_pc  principal components indicator of the 
degree to which regulations force 
banks to disclose accurate, transparent 
information to the public and whether 
regulations facilitate and encourage 
private sector monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine. (2001) 
ospower Official  supervisory power index based 
on 2003 Banking Regulation Survey. 
The value is the summary of the “1” 
(yes) or “0” (no) answers to 16 survey 
questions related with bank 
supervision, such as “Can supervisors 
meet with any external auditors to 
discuss their reports without 
bank approval?” etc., A higher value 
indicating more supervisory power. 
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine. (2003) 
Corup0204  Corruption index averaged over 
2002~04 
ICRG, available at http://www.countrydata.com/ 
Law0204  Law and order index average over 
2002~04 
ICRG, available at http://www.countrydata.com/ 
bank_corup Bank  Corruption index which is the 
response to the question “How 
problematic is corruption of bank 
officials for the operation and growth of 
your business?”. Answers vary 
between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 
(major obstacle).  
WBES survey, 2000, available at  
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-
wbes 
b_corup01  binary response  based on Bank  Same as above   35
Corruption index– with 1(no obstacle) 
recoded as 0, and all the other values 
recoded as 1(obstacle to various 
degree) 
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